



# **Pentium<sup>®</sup> II Processor Specification Update**

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The Pentium<sup>®</sup> II processor may contain design defects or errors known as errata which may cause the product to deviate from published specifications. Current characterized errata are documented in this Specification Update.

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The Pentium® II processor may contain design defects or errors known as errata which may cause the product to deviate from published specifications. Current characterized errata are available on request.

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## REVISION HISTORY

<b>Date of Revision</b>	<b>Version</b>	<b>Description</b>
May 1997	-001	This document is the first Specification Update for the Pentium® II processor.
June 1997	-002	Added Erratum 25. Update Erratum 13 status in the Summary Table of Changes. Added Documentation Change Table and Documentation Change 1. Added 300-MHz Pentium II processor information.
July 1997	-003	Added Erratum 26. Added Specification Change Table and Specification Changes 1 and 2.

## PREFACE

This document is an update to the specifications contained the *Pentium® II Processor Developer's Manual* (Order Number 243341), the *Pentium® II Processor Datasheet* and the *Intel Architecture Software Developer's Manual, Volumes 1, 2 and 3* (Order Numbers 243190, 243191, and 243192, respectively). It is intended for hardware system manufacturers and software developers of applications, operating systems, or tools. It contains Specification Changes, S-Specs, Errata, Specification Clarifications, and Documentation Changes.

### Nomenclature

**Specification Changes** are modifications to the current published specifications for the Pentium® II processor. These changes will be incorporated in the next release of the specifications.

**S-Specs** are exceptions to the published specifications, and apply only to the units assembled under that s-spec.

**Specification Clarifications** describe a specification in greater detail or further highlight a specification's impact to a complex design situation. These clarifications will be incorporated in the next release of the specifications.

**Documentation Changes** include typos, errors, or omissions from the current published specifications. These changes will be incorporated in the next release of the specifications.

**Errata** are design defects or errors. Errata may cause the Pentium II processor's behavior to deviate from published specifications. Hardware and software designed to be used with any given processor stepping must assume that all errata documented for that processor stepping are present on all devices.

### Identification Information

The Pentium II processor can be identified by the following values:

<b>Family<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>233-, 266-, 300-MHz Model 3<sup>2</sup></b>
0110	0011

**NOTES:**

1. The Family corresponds to bits [11:8] of the EDX register after RESET, bits [11:8] of the EAX register after the CPUID instruction is executed with a 1 in the EAX register, and the generation field of the Device ID register accessible through Boundary Scan.
2. The Model corresponds to bits [7:4] of the EDX register after RESET, bits [7:4] of the EAX register after the CPUID instruction is executed with a 1 in the EAX register, and the model field of the Device ID register accessible through Boundary Scan.

The Pentium II processor's second level (L2) cache size can be determined by the following register contents:

<b>512-Kbyte Unified L2 Cache<sup>1</sup></b>	43h
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**NOTE:**

1. For the Pentium® II processor, the unified L2 cache size corresponds to the value in bits [3:0] of the EDX register after the CPUID instruction is executed with a 2 in the EAX register. Other Intel microprocessor models or families may move this information to other bit positions or otherwise reformat the result returned by this instruction; generic code should parse the resulting token stream according to the definition of the CPUID instruction.

# **Specification Update for Pentium® II Processors**








## GENERAL INFORMATION

### *Pentium® II Processor Markings*

#### Dynamic Mark Area



2-D Matrix Mark  
Intel UCC#  
Order Code (Product - speed)  
S Number  
Lot Number (date, factory)





**Basic Pentium® II Processor Identification Information**

CPUID									
Type	Family	Model	Stepping	Core Stepping	L2 Size (Kbytes)	T6 (82459AB) TagRAM Stepping	S-Spec	ECC/ Non-ECC	Speed (MHz) Core/Bus
0	6	3	3	C0	512	B0	SL264	non-ECC	233/66
0	6	3	3	C0	512	B0	SL265	non-ECC	266/66
0	6	3	3	C0	512	B0	SL268	ECC	233/66
0	6	3	3	C0	512	B0	SL269	ECC	266/66
0	6	3	3	C0	512	B0	SL28R	ECC	300/66

**Pentium® II Processor Package Information**

S-Spec Number	Core			Processor Substrate Revision	Cartridge Revision
	Stepping	Speed (MHz)	L2 Size (Kbytes)		
SL264	C0	233	512	D	3.00
SL265	C0	266	512	D	3.00
SL268	C0	233	512	D	3.00
SL269	C0	266	512	D	3.00
SL28R	C0	300	512	D	3.00

### *Summary Table of Changes*

The following table indicates the Specification Changes, Errata, Specification Clarifications, or Documentation Changes which apply to the Pentium II processors. Intel intends to fix some of the errata in a future stepping of the component, and to account for the other outstanding issues through documentation or specification changes as noted. This table uses the following notations:

#### **CODES USED IN SUMMARY TABLE**

X:	Specification Change, Erratum, Specification Clarification, or Documentation Change applies to the given processor stepping.
Doc:	Intel intends to update the appropriate documentation in a future revision.
Fix:	This erratum is intended to be fixed in a future stepping of the component.
Fixed:	This erratum has been previously fixed.
NoFix:	There are no plans to fix this erratum.
(No mark) or (blank box):	This item is fixed in or does not apply to the given stepping.
AP:	APIC related erratum.
SUB:	This column refers to errata on the Pentium® II processor substrate.
Shaded:	This erratum is either new or modified from the previous version of the document.

NO.	C0	SUB	Plans	ERRATA
1	X		NoFix	FP Operand Pointer may be incorrectly calculated after FP access which wraps 64-Kbyte boundary in 16-bit code
2	X		NoFix	Differences exist in debug exception reporting
3	X		NoFix	FLUSH# servicing delayed while waiting for STARTUP_IPI in 2-way MP systems
4	X		NoFix	Code fetch matching disabled debug register may cause debug exception
5	X		NoFix	Double ECC error on read may result in BINIT#
6	X		NoFix	FP inexact-result exception flag may not be set
7	X		NoFix	BTM for SMI will contain incorrect FROM EIP
8	X		NoFix	I/O restart in SMM may fail after simultaneous MCE
9	X		NoFix	Branch traps do not function if BTMs are also enabled
10	X		NoFix	Checker BIST failure in FRC mode not signaled
11	X		NoFix	BINIT# assertion causes FRCERR assertion in FRC mode
12	X		NoFix	Machine Check Exception handler may not always execute successfully
13	X		Fixed	MCE due to L2 parity error gives L1 MCACOD.LL
14	X		NoFix	LBER may be corrupted after some events
15	X		NoFix	BTM's may be corrupted during simultaneous L1 cache line replacement
16	X		Fix	System may hang due to internal protocol violation
17	X		Fix	Livelock condition may cause system hang
18	X		Fix	Mispredicted branch may cause incorrect tag word on MMX technology instructions
19	X		Fix	Thermal sensor/THERMTRIP# does not work
20	X		Fix	Spurious machine check exception via IFU data parity error
21	X		Fix	Loss of inclusion in IFU can cause Machine Check Exception
22	X		Fix	IFU stream buffers not invalidated for INVLPG and ITLB invalidation



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<b>NO.</b>	<b>C0</b>	<b>SUB</b>	<b>Plans</b>	<b>ERRATA</b>
23	X		Fix	L2 performance counters miscount L2_RQSTS
24	X		Fix	Erroneous Signaling of User Mode Protection Violation
25	X		Fix	Invalid operation not signaled by the FIST instruction on some out of range operands
26	X		Fix	FLUSH# assertion disables L2 Machine Check Exception reporting
1AP	X		NoFix	APIC access to cacheable memory causes SHUTDOWN
2AP	X		NoFix	2-way MP systems may hang due to catastrophic errors during BSP determination
3AP	X		NoFix	Write to mask LVT (programmed as EXTINT) will not deassert outstanding interrupt
<b>NO.</b>	<b>C0</b>	<b>SUB</b>	<b>Plans</b>	<b>DOCUMENTATION CHANGES</b>
<b>1</b>	<b>X</b>		Doc	Note 4 of table 13, note 6 of table 16, Output Valid Delay specified to 2.5V +5% in datasheet
<b>NO.</b>	<b>C0</b>	<b>SUB</b>	<b>Plans</b>	<b>SPECIFICATION CHANGES</b>
1	X		Doc	BCLK period stability change from $\pm 250\text{ps}$ to $\pm 300\text{ps}$
2	X		Doc	VccCORE transient tolerance change by 5mV and 10mV

## ERRATA

### 1. *FP Operand Pointer May Be Incorrectly Calculated After FP Access Which Wraps 64-Kbyte Boundary in 16-Bit Code*

**PROBLEM:** The FP Operand Pointer is the effective address of the operand associated with the last non-control floating-point instruction executed by the machine. If an 80-bit floating-point access (load or store) occurs in a 16-bit mode other than protected mode (in which case the access will produce a segment limit violation), the memory access wraps a 64-Kbyte boundary, and the floating-point environment is subsequently saved in 32-bit mode, the subtraction routine used to calculate the FP Operand Pointer will assume the floating-point access was in 32-bit mode, and the high word of the address will be FFFFh instead of 0000h.

**IMPLICATION:** A 32-bit operating system running 16-bit floating-point code may encounter this erratum, under the following conditions:

- The operating system is using a segment greater than 64 Kbytes in size.
- An application is running in a 16-bit mode other than protected mode.
- An 80-bit floating-point load which wraps the 64-Kbyte boundary is executed.
- The operating system uses a 32-bit handler on an unmasked exception which occurs during the load.
- The exception handler uses the value contained in the FP Operand Pointer.

Wrapping an 80-bit floating-point load around a segment boundary in this way is not a normal programming practice. Intel has not currently identified any software which exhibits this behavior.

**WORKAROUND:** If the FP Operand Pointer is used in a 32-bit exception handler in an OS which may run 16-bit floating-point code, care must be taken to ensure that no 80-bit floating-point accesses are wrapped around a 64-Kbyte boundary.

**STATUS:** For the steppings affected see the Summary Table of Changes at the beginning of this section.

### 2. *Differences Exist in Debug Exception Reporting*

**PROBLEM:** There exist some differences in the reporting of code and data breakpoint matches between that specified by previous Intel processors' specifications and the behavior of the Pentium II processor, as described below:

#### **CASE 1:**

The first case is for a breakpoint set on a MOVSS or POPSS instruction, when the instruction following it causes a debug register protection fault (DR7.gd is already set, enabling the fault). The Pentium processor reports delayed data breakpoint matches from the MOVSS or POPSS instructions by setting the matching DR6.bi bits, along with the debug register protection fault

(DR6.bd). If additional breakpoint faults are matched during the call of the debug fault handler, the Pentium processor sets the breakpoint match bits (DR6.bi) to reflect the breakpoints matched by both the MOVSS or POPSS breakpoint and the debug fault handler call. The Pentium II processor only sets DR6.bd in either situation, and does not set any of the DR6.bi bits.

**CASE 2:**

In the second breakpoint reporting failure case, if a MOVSS or POPSS instruction with a data breakpoint is followed by a store to memory which crosses a 4-Kbyte page boundary, the breakpoint information for the MOVSS or POPSS will be lost. Previous processors retain this information across such a page split.

**CASE 3:**

If they occur after a MOVSS or POPSS instruction, the INT *n*, INTO, and INT3 instructions zero the DR6.Bi bits (bits B0 through B3), clearing pending breakpoint information, unlike previous processors.

**CASE 4:**

If a data breakpoint and an SMI (System Management Interrupt) occur simultaneously, the SMI will be serviced via a call to the SMM handler, and the pending breakpoint will be lost.

**IMPLICATION:** When debugging or when developing debuggers for a Pentium II processor based system, this behavior should be noted. Normal usage of the MOVSS or POPSS instructions (i.e. following them with a MOV ESP) will not exhibit the behavior of cases 1-3. Debugging in conjunction with SMM will be limited by case 4 (no workaround has been identified for this case).

**WORKAROUND:** Following MOVSS and POPSS instructions with a MOV ESP instruction when using breakpoints will avoid the first three cases of this erratum.

**STATUS:** For the steppings affected see the Summary Table of Changes at the beginning of this section.

### 3. *FLUSH# Servicing Delayed While Waiting for STARTUP\_IPI in 2-way MP Systems*

**PROBLEM:** In a 2-way MP system, if an application processor is waiting for a startup interprocessor interrupt (STARTUP\_IPI), then it will not service a FLUSH# pin assertion until it has received the STARTUP\_IPI.

**IMPLICATION:** After the 2-way MP initialization protocol, only one processor becomes the bootstrap processor (BSP). The other processor becomes a slave application processor (AP). After losing the BSP arbitration, the AP goes into a wait loop, waiting for a STARTUP\_IPI. The BSP can wake up the AP to perform some tasks with a STARTUP\_IPI, and then put it back to sleep with an initialization interprocessor interrupt (INIT\_IPI, which has the same affect as asserting INIT#), which returns it to a wait loop. The result is a possible loss of cache coherency

if the offline processor is intended to service a FLUSH# assertion at this point. The FLUSH# will be serviced as soon as the processor is awakened by a STARTUP\_IPI, before any other instructions are executed. Intel has not encountered any operating systems that are affected by this erratum.

**WORKAROUND:** Operating system developers should take care to execute a WBINVD instruction before the AP is taken offline using an INIT\_IPI.

**STATUS:** For the steppings affected see the Summary Table of Changes at the beginning of this section.

#### 4. *Code Fetch Matching Disabled Debug Register May Cause Debug Exception*

**PROBLEM:** The bits L0-3 and G0-3 enable breakpoints local to a task and global to all tasks, respectively. If one of these bits is set, a breakpoint is enabled, corresponding to the addresses in the debug registers DR0-DR3. If at least one of these breakpoints is enabled, any of these registers are *disabled* (i.e.  $L_n$  and  $G_n$  are 0), and  $RW_n$  for the disabled register is 00 (indicating a breakpoint on instruction execution), normally an instruction fetch will not cause an instruction-breakpoint fault based on a match with the address in the disabled register (s). However, if the address in a disabled register matches the address of a code fetch which also results in a page fault, an instruction-breakpoint fault will occur.

**IMPLICATION:** While debugging software, extraneous instruction-breakpoint faults may be encountered if breakpoint registers are not cleared when they are disabled. Debug software which does not implement a code breakpoint handler will fail, if this occurs. If a handler is present, the fault will be serviced. Mixing data and code may exacerbate this problem by allowing disabled data breakpoint registers to break on an instruction fetch.

**WORKAROUND:** The debug handler should clear breakpoint registers before they become disabled.

**STATUS:** For the steppings affected see the Summary Table of Changes at the beginning of this section.

#### 5. *Double ECC Error on Read May Result in BINIT#*

**PROBLEM:** For this erratum to occur, the following conditions must be met:

- Machine Check Exceptions (MCEs) must be enabled.
- A dataless transaction (such as a write invalidate) must be occurring simultaneously with a transaction which returns data (a normal read).
- The read data must contain a double-bit uncorrectable ECC error.

If these conditions are met, the Pentium II processor will not be able to determine which transaction was erroneous, and instead of generating an MCE, it will generate a BINIT#.

**IMPLICATION:** The bus will be reinitialized in this case. However, since a double-bit uncorrectable ECC error occurred on the read, the MCE handler (which is normally reached on



a double-bit uncorrectable ECC error for a read) would most likely cause the same BINIT# event.

**WORKAROUND:** Though the ability to drive BINIT# can be disabled in the Pentium II processor, which would prevent the effects of this erratum, overall system behavior would not improve, since the error which would normally cause a BINIT# would instead cause the machine to shut down. No other workaround has been identified.

**STATUS:** For the steppings affected see the Summary Table of Changes at the beginning of this section.

## 6. *FP Inexact-Result Exception Flag May Not Be Set*

**PROBLEM:** When the result of a floating-point operation is not exactly representable in the destination format (1/3 in binary form, for example), an inexact-result (precision) exception occurs. When this occurs, the PE bit (bit 5 of the FPU status word) is normally set by the processor. Under certain rare conditions, this bit may not be set when this rounding occurs. However, other actions taken by the processor (invoking the software exception handler if the exception is unmasked) are not affected. This erratum can only occur if the floating-point operation which causes the precision exception is immediately followed by one of the following instructions:

- FST m32real/m64real
- FSTP m32real/m64real

Note that even if this combination of instructions is encountered, there is also a dependency on the internal pipelining and execution state of both instructions in the processor.

**IMPLICATION:** Inexact-result exceptions are commonly masked or ignored by applications, as it happens frequently, and produces a rounded result acceptable to most applications. The PE bit of the FPU status word may not always be set upon receiving an inexact-result exception. Thus, if these exceptions are unmasked, a floating-point error exception handler may not recognize that a precision exception occurred. Note that this is a “sticky” bit, i.e. once set by an inexact-result condition, it remains set until cleared by software.

**WORKAROUND:** This condition can be avoided by inserting a NOP instruction between the two floating-point instructions.

**STATUS:** For the steppings affected see the Summary Table of Changes at the beginning of this section.

## 7. *BTM for SMI Will Contain Incorrect FROM EIP*

**PROBLEM:** A system management interrupt (SMI) will produce a Branch Trace Message (BTM), if BTMs are enabled. However, the FROM EIP field of the BTM (used to determine the address of the instruction which was being executed when the SMI was serviced) will not have been updated for the SMI, so the field will report the same FROM EIP as the previous BTM.

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**IMPLICATION:** A BTM which is issued for an SMI will not contain the correct FROM EIP, limiting the usefulness of BTMs for debugging software in conjunction with System Management Mode (SMM).

**WORKAROUND:** None identified at this time.

**STATUS:** For the steppings affected see the Summary Table of Changes at the beginning of this section.

### 8. *I/O Restart in SMM May Fail After Simultaneous MCE*

**PROBLEM:** If an I/O instruction (IN, INS, REP INS, OUT, OUTS, or REP OUTS) is being executed, and if the data for this instruction becomes corrupted, the Pentium II processor will signal a machine check exception (MCE). If the instruction is directed at a device which is powered down, the processor may also receive an assertion of SMI#. Since MCEs have higher priority, the processor will call the MCE handler, and the SMI# assertion will remain pending. However, upon attempting to execute the first instruction of the MCE handler, the SMI# will be recognized and the processor will attempt to execute the SMM handler. If the SMM handler is completed successfully, it will attempt to restart the I/O instruction, but will not have the correct machine state, due to the call to the MCE handler.

**IMPLICATION:** A simultaneous MCE and SMI# assertion may occur for one of the I/O instructions above. The SMM handler may attempt to restart such an I/O instruction, but will have corrupted state due to the MCE handler call, leading to failure of the restart and SHUTDOWN of the processor.

**WORKAROUND:** If a system implementation must support both SMM and MCEs, the first thing the SMM handler code (when an I/O restart is to be performed) should do is check for a pending MCE. If there is an MCE pending, the SMM handler should immediately exit via an RSM instruction and allow the MCE handler to execute and restart the I/O instruction. If there is not, the SMM handler may proceed with its normal operation.

**STATUS:** For the steppings affected see the Summary Table of Changes at the beginning of this section.

### 9. *Branch Traps Do Not Function if BTMs Are Also Enabled*

**PROBLEM:** If branch traps or branch trace messages (BTMs) are enabled alone, both function as expected. However, if both are enabled, only the BTMs will function, and the branch traps will be ignored.

**IMPLICATION:** The branch traps and branch trace message debugging features cannot be used together.

**WORKAROUND:** If branch trap functionality is desired, BTMs must be disabled.

**STATUS:** For the steppings affected see the Summary Table of Changes at the beginning of this section.

### **10. *Checker BIST Failure in FRC Mode Not Signaled***

**PROBLEM:** If a system is running in functional redundancy checking (FRC) mode, and the checker of the master-checker pair encounters a hard failure while running the built-in self test (BIST), the checker will tri-state all outputs without signaling an IERR#.

**IMPLICATION:** Assuming the master passes BIST successfully, it will continue execution unchecked, operating without functional redundancy. However, the necessary pull-up on the FRCERR pin will cause an FRCERR to be signaled. The operation of the master depends on the implementation of FRCERR.

**WORKAROUND:** For successful detection of BIST failure in the checker of an FRC pair, use the FRCERR signal, instead of IERR#.

**STATUS:** For the steppings affected see the Summary Table of Changes at the beginning of this section.

### **11. *BINIT# Assertion Causes FRCERR Assertion in FRC Mode***

**PROBLEM:** If a pair of Pentium II processors are running in functional redundancy checking (FRC) mode, and a catastrophic error condition causes BINIT# to be asserted, the checker in the master-checker pair will enter SHUTDOWN. The next bus transaction from the master will then result in the assertion of FRCERR.

**IMPLICATION:** Bus initialization via an assertion of BINIT# occurs as the result of a catastrophic error condition which precludes the continuing reliable execution of the system. Under normal circumstances, the master-checker pair would remain synchronized in the execution of the BINIT# handler. However, due to this erratum, an FRCERR will be signaled. System behavior then depends on the behavior of the system specific error recovery mechanisms.

**WORKAROUND:** None identified at this time.

**STATUS:** For the steppings affected see the Summary Table of Changes at the beginning of this section.

### **12. *Machine Check Exception Handler May Not Always Execute Successfully***

**PROBLEM:** An asynchronous machine check exception (MCE), such as a BINIT# event, which occurs during an access that splits a 4-Kbyte page boundary may leave some internal registers in an indeterminate state. Thus, MCE handler code may not always run successfully if an asynchronous MCE has occurred previously.

**IMPLICATION:** An MCE may not always result in the successful execution of the MCE handler. However, asynchronous MCEs usually occur upon detection of a catastrophic system condition that would also hang the processor. Leaving MCEs disabled will result in the condition which caused the asynchronous MCE instead causing the processor to enter SHUTDOWN. Therefore, leaving MCEs disabled may not improve overall system behavior.

**WORKAROUND:** No workaround which would guarantee successful MCE handler execution under this condition has been identified.

**STATUS:** For the steppings affected see the Summary Table of Changes at the beginning of this section.

### ***13. MCE Due to L2 Parity Error Gives L1 MCACOD.LL***

**PROBLEM:** If a Cache Reply Parity (CRP) error, Cache Address Parity (CAP) error, or Cache Synchronous Error (CSER) occurs on an access to the Pentium II processor's L2 cache, the resulting Machine Check Architectural Error Code (MCACOD) will be logged with `01' in the LL field. This value indicates an L1 cache error; the value should be `10', indicating an L2 cache error. Note L2 ECC errors have the correct value of '10' logged.

**IMPLICATION:** An L2 cache access error, other than an ECC error, will be improperly logged as an L1 cache error in MCACOD.LL.

**WORKAROUND:** None identified at this time.

**STATUS:** For the steppings affected see the Summary Table of Changes at the beginning of this section.

### ***14. LBER May Be Corrupted After Some Events***

**PROBLEM:** The last branch record (LBR) and the last branch before exception record (LBER) can be used to determine the source and destination information for previous branches or exceptions. The LBR contains the source and destination addresses for the last branch or exception, and the LBER contains similar information for the last branch taken before the last exception. This information is typically used to determine the location of a branch which leads to execution of code which causes an exception. However, after a catastrophic bus condition which results in an assertion of BINIT# and the reinitialization of the buses, the value in the LBER may be corrupted. Also, after either a CALL which results in a fault or a software interrupt, the LBER and LBR will be updated to the same value, when the LBER should not have been updated.

**IMPLICATION:** The LBER and LBR registers are used only for debugging purposes. When this erratum occurs, the LBER will not contain reliable address information. The value of LBER should be used with caution when debugging branching code; if the values in the LBR and LBER are the same, then the LBER value is incorrect. Also, the value in the LBER should not be relied upon after a BINIT# event.

**WORKAROUND:** None identified at this time.

**STATUS:** For the steppings affected see the Summary Table of Changes at the beginning of this section.

### ***15. BTMs May Be Corrupted During Simultaneous L1 Cache Line Replacement***

**PROBLEM:** When Branch Trace Messages (BTMs) are enabled and such a message is generated, the BTM may be corrupted when issued to the bus by the L1 cache if a new line of data is brought into the L1 data cache simultaneously. Though the new line being stored in the L1

cache is stored correctly, and no corruption occurs in the data, the information in the BTM may be incorrect due to the internal collision of the data line and the BTM.

**IMPLICATION:** Although BTMs may not be entirely reliable due to this erratum, the conditions necessary for this boundary condition to occur have only been exhibited during focused simulation testing. Intel has currently not observed this erratum in a system level validation environment.

**WORKAROUND:** None identified at this time.

**STATUS:** For the steppings affected see the Summary Table of Changes at the beginning of this section.

## **16. System May Hang Due To Internal Protocol Violation**

**PROBLEM:** Pentium II processor based systems may hang due to an internal protocol violation. When a snoopable transaction is issued on the bus and the cache line being accessed is in the modified state, the processor must deliver to the system bus an updated copy of the cache line. When the processor attempts to deliver the most up to date copy via an implicit writeback, the data transfer transaction fails and the DBSY# signal remains asserted until the next RESET#. This causes the system to hang indefinitely. In order to encounter this erratum, the following sequence of events must occur:

1. A snoopable transaction (transaction 1) is issued on the system bus. The processor contains in its L1 and/or L2 caches the data for this line in the modified state.
2. Another snoopable transaction (transaction 2) is issued and the processor contains this line only in its L2 cache in the modified state. Both of these transactions can be issued by either the chipset, by the processor (in which case they are of the self-snoop type), by another processor (2-way MP systems), or any combination thereof.
3. A non-snoopable transaction is then issued (transaction 3) for which address bits A15-A5 are the same as those in transaction 2.
4. Transaction 3 is followed by a snoopable transaction (transaction 4).
5. The completion of the data transfer phase of transaction 1 must line up with the snoop response phase of transaction 3. This data transfer phase of transaction 1 must occur after the ADS# of transaction 4 and line up with the completion of an internal cache transaction.
6. The internal cache transaction must miss the L2 targeting a line for eviction, but the internal cache transaction must be such that it has to be re-tried.

The result of this sequence of transactions causes the processor bus to lock up after delivering the data for transaction 1, but prior to delivering the data for transaction 2. Since this data is never delivered, DBSY# does not deassert and the system hangs.

**IMPLICATION:** The Pentium II processor may cause a system to hang if the above listed sequence of events occurs. This sequence is a necessary condition to hit the erratum, but multiple variations of this sequence which also cause this erratum are also possible. The probability of encountering this erratum increases with I/O queue depth greater than 4 and in 2-way MP systems.

**WORKAROUND:** None identified at this time.

**STATUS:** For the steppings affected see the Summary Table of Changes at the beginning of this section.

### ***17. Livelock Condition May Cause System Hang***

**PROBLEM:** A "livelock" situation could occur in 2-way MP Pentium II processor-based systems, when IOQ depth is set to 1, with a failure signature such that a processor arbitrates for the system bus but fails to drive out a transaction when it gains ownership of the bus. The processor then relinquishes bus ownership to another requester, but on re-arbitration performs the same repetitive actions. This course of action continues until RESET# is asserted. The failure signature in 2-way MP systems is such that both processors require execution of an explicit writeback cycle and both processors request the bus for this transaction. However, when the time comes to drive out the writeback transaction, the internal request has been suspended due to an internal blocking condition. After the internal blocking condition has gone away the original writeback request is re-asserted. However, by the time bus ownership has been regained, the blocking condition has recurred, thus suppressing the writeback request before the transaction can be driven out to the system bus.

The writeback which is waiting to go out on the system bus must be issued before the internal blocking condition can be removed. But the writeback can never be issued because of the recurring blocking condition. This causes an "infinite loop" situation to develop, and the processor essentially stops executing code.

**IMPLICATION:** This erratum was observed to occur when both processors are configured for IOQ depth = 1 in Intel commercial system testing.

**WORKAROUND:** None identified at this time.

**STATUS:** For the steppings affected see the Summary Table of Changes at the beginning of this section.

### ***18. Mispredicted Branch May Cause Incorrect Tag Word on MMX™ Technology Instructions***

**PROBLEM:** After any MMX™ technology instruction is executed, all of the FPU stack registers should be marked valid in the FPU tag word. If one or more of the first three instructions of a mispredicted branch are MMX technology instructions of the form "opcode reg, mem" not including MOVD and MOVQ, the FPU tag word is incorrectly modified. Some or all of the tag word bits may remain invalid. This tag word will remain incorrect until one of two events occur:

1. Any MMX™ technology instruction is executed four or more instructions after the branch target, or
2. An MMX technology instruction of the following type is executed:
  - Any MMX technology instruction of the form "opcode reg, reg"

- MOVD
- MOVQ
- EMMS

The following are examples of code that will encounter this erratum.

**Example 1:**

```

EMMS
...
Jcc    target          ; mispredicted as not taken
...
target:
PADDW    mm0, [edi]    ; Is an "reg, mem" format instruction
FSTENV    env

```

In this example, the tag word stored in memory by FSTENV will be incorrect.

**Example 2:**

```

EMMS
...
Jcc    target          ; mispredicted as not taken
...
target:
PADDW    mm0, [edi]
FUCOMPP    ; depends on tag word, also violates coding guideline against
mixing
          ; floating-point and MMX technology instructions
FWAIT

```

In this example, the FUCOMPP instruction will cause a Numeric Invalid Operation Exception if the FPU stack fault exception is unmasked.

**IMPLICATION:** When writing code that mixes FP and MMX technology instructions where the target of a branch is an MMX technology instruction with a memory operand, the FPU tag word may be incorrect. Software that expects the FP stack register to be set to valid after an MMX technology instruction and utilizes this information may be affected.

If floating-point instructions are intermixed, the floating-point instructions may raise the floating-point stack exception. If this exception is unmasked, the application will receive an unexpected numeric exception. The result is application dependent. If the floating-point stack exception is masked, the floating-point instruction will compute with a indefinite operand instead of the register contents. In either case the result is application dependent. Applications that follow the Intel MMX Technology Coding Guidelines against intermixing floating-point and MMX technology code are not affected by this erratum.

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If the floating-point tag word is saved immediately after an affected MMX technology instruction, an erroneous value will be stored. Program behavior is application dependent. This may also cause debuggers to temporarily display incorrect tag word contents.

**WORKAROUND:** The following are possible workarounds to this erratum:

- Follow the Intel MMX™ technology guidelines in the *Intel Architecture Developer's Optimization Manual* for writing MMX technology programs, specifically, do not intermix MMX technology instructions and floating-point instructions.
- Make sure the first instruction at the target of a branch is MOVD, MOVQ, or any instruction except an MMX technology instruction of the form “opcode reg, mem.”
- Use the FSAVE instruction to save all floating-point stack registers if at least one of the registers is valid during a context switch.
- Before a nonstandard transition from MMX technology code to floating-point code, execute a non-susceptible MMX technology instruction such as MOVD eax, mm0.

**STATUS:** For the steppings affected see the Summary Table of Changes at the beginning of this section.

### 19. *Thermal Sensor/THERMTRIP# Does Not Work*

**PROBLEM:** THERMTRIP# is a feature of the Pentium II processor which asserts when the core reaches a certain temperature during operation as specified in the *Pentium® II Processor Datasheet*. The Pentium II processor may assert THERMTRIP# at a temperature lower or higher than the specified trippoint of 135°C for  $T_{\text{JUNCTION}}$ . When THERMTRIP# is asserted, the processor may shut down causing all execution to be halted.

**IMPLICATION:** When running the Pentium II processor, the Pentium II processor core may reach a temperature causing the processor to assert THERMTRIP# early. Once THERMTRIP# has been asserted, the processor may shut down due to this erratum. All execution after the SHUTDOWN will be halted. This erratum is only exhibited when  $T_{\text{PLATE}}$  is above the Maximum Specification of 75°C (See the *Pentium® II Processor Datasheet*, Order Number 243335, for details on specifications).

**WORKAROUND:** Avoid operation of the Pentium II Processor outside of thermal specifications defined by the *Pentium® II Processor Datasheet*. Do not monitor the THERMTRIP# pin (pin A15).

**STATUS:** For the steppings affected see the Summary Table of Changes at the beginning of this section.

### 20. *Spurious Machine Check Exception Via IFU Data Parity Error*

**PROBLEM:** The Pentium II processor can signal an unrecoverable Machine Check Exception (MCE) in the event that the Instruction Fetch Unit (IFU) detects a mismatch when verifying instruction parity. The execution of code which modifies the current instruction sequence that



may already be fetched into the processor can cause an instruction at a given address to appear differently depending on when it was fetched in time relative to its being modified. Thus, a speculatively prefetched instruction may have been modified such that it now differs from the copy of the same instruction resident in the instruction cache. This discrepancy (of one copy located in the speculative prefetch portion, and a different copy in the instruction cache) is sensed by the IFU. When the IFU detects that the instruction stream has been modified, it flushes the pipeline and attempts to restart the instruction stream. In the interim, the IFU recognizes the disparate instructions described above, and signals a data parity error. The data parity error is signaled as an MCE before the instruction stream has had a chance to restart. This MCE will cause an operating system that has enabled MCE to shut down. No incorrect code is executed by the processor in this situation (even if MCE is disabled). Note that this erratum occurs under a specific set of address dependencies and timing events.

**IMPLICATION:** Executing such a sequence by modifying code without proper synchronization may not always result in predictable program behavior. The processor's signaling of an MCE due to a data parity error in the IFU may then result in an unexpected system halt if the above conditions are met and MCEs are enabled.

**WORKAROUND:** It is possible for BIOS code to contain a workaround for this erratum.

**STATUS:** For the steppings affected see the Summary Table of Changes at the beginning of this section.

## **21. *Loss of Inclusion In IFU Can Cause Machine Check Exception***

**PROBLEM:** The Pentium II processor can signal an unrecoverable Machine Check Exception (MCE) as a consistency checking mechanism in the event that the Instruction Fetch Unit (IFU) detects differences in the consistency of code in instruction streaming buffers against code resident in the instruction cache i.e., a loss of inclusion. When application code makes an operating system call, the processor transitions execution privilege levels. If the code for the OS call is not already resident in the level 1 cache, then the processor may prefetch code while identifying a cache line(s) for eventual eviction to make space for the new code. Upon return from the OS call, the processor continues execution of application code at the user level. The processor, due to deep speculation and branch prediction, may attempt to execute instructions from the previously prefetched kernel code starting by attempting to replace the victim line with kernel code in a buffer internal to the IFU. The IFU detects that the current application is insufficiently privileged to execute the kernel code and so, suppresses the eviction of the previously selected victim line. Despite having detected this condition, the IFU does replace this victim line with the kernel line. If the processor now attempts to restart execution of the current application code by refetching the original victim line it no longer finds it in the instruction cache. The IFU detects this loss of inclusion, and signals this by generating a MCE. If MCEs are enabled, this event can cause an operating system to shut down. Note that this erratum occurs under a specific set of address dependencies and timing events.

**IMPLICATION:** The occurrence of all the conditions above can lead the IFU to signal a loss of inclusion by generating an MCE. If MCEs are enabled in the system, then the operating system

may shut down upon noticing the MCE resulting in system failure. If MCEs are disabled, then unpredictable application behavior is theoretically possible, although current validation has shown execution to continue normally.

**WORKAROUND:** It is possible for BIOS code to contain a workaround for this erratum.

**STATUS:** For the steppings affected see the Summary Table of Changes at the beginning of this section.

## 22. *IFU Stream Buffers Not Invalidated for INVLPG and ITLB Invalidation*

**PROBLEM:** Certain instructions in the Intel Architecture instruction set require the IFU streaming buffers to be invalidated. These instructions (where X denotes any DR register, and xxx denotes any operand)

- INVLPG
- MOV CR0, xxx
- MOV CR3, xxx
- MOV CR4, xxx
- MOV DR(X), xxx

• WRMSR

and the events

- ITLB page fault
- Task switch

All require invalidation of the IFU streaming buffers. In the Pentium II processor, these buffers are sometimes not correctly invalidated.

**IMPLICATION:** If the IFU streaming buffers are not invalidated appropriately, the processor may halt normal execution.

**WORKAROUND:** It is possible for BIOS code to contain a workaround for this erratum.

**STATUS:** For the steppings affected see the Summary Table of Changes at the beginning of this section.

## 23. *L2 Performance Counters Miscalculate L2\_RQSTS*

**PROBLEM:** L2\_RQSTS is a performance counter that counts the number of L2 cache access requests. This counter increments for each incoming L2 cache request. In some cases, an L2 request cannot be serviced by the L2 Cache. This request is then retried at a later time when the request can be serviced by the L2 cache. When this happens, the L2\_RQSTS counter counts the initial L2 cache request **and** the retried L2 cache request, thereby counting the same request twice.

**IMPLICATION:** The L2\_RQSTS counter may contain a larger erroneous number of L2 cache requests due to this erratum. This erratum does not affect functionality of the Pentium II processor. This erratum only affects the performance counter specified.

**WORKAROUND:** None identified at this time.

**STATUS:** For the steppings affected see the Summary Table of Changes at the beginning of this section.

#### 24. *Erroneous Signaling of User Mode Protection Violation*

**PROBLEM:** If the Pentium II processor attempts to access a page in physical memory marked not present (Present bit clear), a page fault exception (#PF) is generated. Before proceeding, there is a narrow internal timing window where the processor verifies that no other higher priority fault conditions are present. During this time, it is possible for another agent to allocate a new page directory or page table entry (PDE/PTE) corresponding to the same linear address of the original access, writing new values into the PDE/PTE with the Access bit (A-bit) cleared. When the original processor completes its checking for other fault conditions, and re-examines the A-bit of the recently modified PDE/PTE, it finds that it has been cleared. Internal hardware correctly signals this scenario as a condition to which the processor should respond by setting the A-bit, but erroneously reports it as a generic paging protection violation. Instead of attempting to set the appropriate A/D bit, this event is reported as an Int14 with exception code 0x05, i.e., user mode protection violation.

**IMPLICATION:** The occurrence of this scenario will result in the erroneous signaling of a user mode protection violation instead of a page fault and may result in application termination depending on operating system behavior in response to a user mode protection violation. This situation has only been observed to date in multi-processor operating systems.

**WORKAROUND:** Operating systems which allocate new PTEs and PDEs should set the Access bit (A-bit) to work around this erratum. Alternately, an operating system's Int14 handler can determine if a protection violation condition truly exists, and if none is found, return without further action.

**STATUS:** For the steppings affected see the Summary Table of Changes at the beginning of this section.

#### 25. *Invalid Operation Not Signaled By The FIST Instruction on Some Out of Range Operands*

**PROBLEM:** On certain, large, negative, floating-point operands, and only in three of the four possible processor rounding modes, the instructions FIST[P] m16int and FIST[P] m32int do not detect that the operand is so large that it will not fit into the target data size. As a consequence, the expected Invalid Operation exception response for this situation is not correctly provided, nor is the Invalid Operation flag set in the Floating Point status word as specified in the *Intel Architecture Programmers Reference Manual, Volume 2*. Under the failing conditions, noted below, the precision exception (#PE) will also be incorrectly set.

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The erratum occurs only when all of the following conditions are met:

1. The FIST[P] instruction is either a 16- or 32-bit operation; 64-bit operations are unaffected.
2. Either the 'to nearest', 'to zero' or 'up' rounding modes are being used. The round 'down' mode is unaffected by this erratum.
3. The sign bit of the floating-point operand is negative.
4. The floating-point operand being converted is significantly more negative than can be described by the integer size being targeted.

## ACTUAL vs. EXPECTED RESPONSE

A. *Actual Response:*

When the required conditions are encountered, the processor provides the following response:

- Return the MAXNEG value (8000h for FIST16 & 80000000h for FIST32) to memory.
- The IE (Invalid Operation) bit in the Floating Point status word is *not set* to flag the use of an invalid operand.
- The PE (precision error) bit the Floating Point status word is *set*.
- No exception handler is invoked.
- In the case of a FISTP instruction the Operand will have been popped from the floating point stack

B. *Expected Response*

The expected processor response when the invalid operation exception is *masked* is:


- Return the MAXNEG value (8000h for FIST16 & 80000000h for FIST32) to memory.
- The IE (Invalid Operation) bit in the Floating Point status word is *set* to flag the overflow.
- The PE (precision error) bit the Floating Point status word is *not set*.

The expected processor response when the invalid operation exception is *unmasked* is:

- Do not return a result to memory. Keep the original operand intact on the stack.
- The IE (Invalid Operation) bit in the Floating Point status word is *set* to flag the overflow.
- The PE (precision error) bit the Floating Point status word is *not set*.
- Vector to the user numeric exception handler.

**IMPLICATION:** Erroneous operation results when the operand is so large that it will not fit into the target data size. The operands affected by this erratum are significantly outside (by a factor of 3X) the range that can be, correctly, converted to an integer value. The figure below and corresponding table identifies the normal range of integer numbers (between A and B) and the starting point of the operands affected by this erratum. Discrete failing operands will be present in the range between point C and the maximum negative number that can be represented by the processor ( $-2^{1023}$  in double precision format). Note 2 below gives a qualitative description of the nature of the discrete failing values. Software that does not rely on the Invalid Operation

exception flag being set and signaled by either an exception OR by software polling is not impacted by this erratum.



16-bit Operation	A	B	C
	-32,768.0	+32,767.0	< -98304.0
32-bit Operation	A	B	C
	-2,147,483,648.0	+2,147,483,647.0	< -6,442,450,944.0

**WORKAROUND:** Any of two software workarounds will avoid occurrence of this erratum:

1. Range checking performed prior to execution of the FIST[P] instruction will prevent the overflow condition from occurring, and may already be implemented as a standard coding style.
2. Software can use the presence of MAXNEG in the result integer to indicate that an out of range conversion may have occurred.

Note 1: A possible alternative is to use the FIST64 instruction to store the converted operand to memory and access the lower 16 or 32 bits as the required integer. Even though this mechanism will not signal an attempted out of range conversion with a 16 bit or 32 bit target, it is currently in use by many compilers today.

Note 2: The values affected by this erratum are those which contain an exponent value within the affected range, AND a specific bit pattern at a specific offset within the mantissa, AND at least one non-zero bit to the right of the above bit pattern. The offset within the mantissa is a function of the floating point exponent value. The specific bit pattern is 0x8000 for FIST16 and 0x80000000 for FIST32. This means that for any given exponent within the range, one mantissa value in every  $2^{16}$  possible mantissa values exhibits the erratum for FIST16, and one mantissa value in every  $2^{32}$  possible mantissa values exhibits the erratum for FIST32.

Examples of affected values for FIST16, 80 bit binary notation (not an exhaustive list) (xx means any bit pattern, yy means any non-zero bit pattern)



MCEs are enabled, an MCE will occur. However, in this circumstance, a second MCE will be signaled. The second MCE signal will cause the Pentium II processor to enter SHUTDOWN.

**IMPLICATION:** Recovery from a PIC access to cacheable memory will not be successful. Software that accesses only UC type memory during APIC operations will not encounter this erratum.

**WORKAROUND:** Ensure that the memory space to which PIC accesses can be made is marked as type UC (uncacheable) in the memory type range registers (MTRRs) to avoid this erratum.

**STATUS:** For the steppings affected see the Summary Table of Changes at the beginning of this section.

### ***2AP. 2-way MP Systems May Hang Due to Catastrophic Errors During BSP Determination***

**PROBLEM:** In 2-way MP systems, a catastrophic error during the bootstrap processor (BSP) determination process should cause the assertion of IERR#. If the catastrophic error is due to the APIC data bus being stuck at electrical zero, then the system hangs without asserting IERR#.

**IMPLICATION:** 2-way MP systems may hang during boot due to a catastrophic error. This erratum has not been observed to date in a typical commercial system, but was found during focused system testing using a grounded APIC data bus.

**WORKAROUND:** None identified at this time.

**STATUS:** For the steppings affected see the Summary Table of Changes at the beginning of this section.

### ***3AP. Write to Mask LVT (Programmed as EXTINT) Will Not Deassert Outstanding Interrupt***

**PROBLEM:** If the APIC subsystem is configured in Virtual Wire Mode implemented through the local APIC, (i.e. the 8259 INTR signal is connected to LINT0 and LVT1's interrupt delivery mode field is programmed as EXTINT), a write to LVT1 intended to mask interrupts will not deassert the internal interrupt source if the external LINT0 signal is already asserted. The interrupt will be erroneously posted to the Pentium II processor despite the attempt to mask it via the LVT.

**IMPLICATION:** Because of the masking attempt, interrupts may be generated when the system software expects no interrupts to be posted.

**WORKAROUND:** Software can issue a write to the 8259A interrupt mask register to deassert the LINT0 interrupt level, followed by a read to the controller to ensure that the LINT0 signal has been deasserted. Once this is ensured, software may then issue the write to mask LVT entry 1.

**STATUS:** For the steppings affected see the Summary Table of Changes at the beginning of this section.

## DOCUMENTATION CHANGES

The Documentation Changes listed in this section apply to the *Pentium® II Processor Datasheet*. All Documentation Changes will be incorporated into a future version of the appropriate Pentium II processor documentation.

**1. Note 4 of Table 13 and Note 6 of Table 16, Output Valid Delay Specified to 2.5V +5%**

The following change is to Section 2.13, Table 13, *System Bus AC Specifications (CMOS Signal Group)* and Section 2.13, Table 16, *System Bus AC Specifications (TAP Connection)*.

Note 4 of Table 13 and Note 6 of Table 16 in the *Pentium® II Processor Datasheet* state that the 2.5V Output Valid Delay is specified to  $V_{CCCORE}$ . This is incorrect. Each note should read “Valid delay timings for these signals are specified to 2.5V +5%. See Table 3 for pull-up resistor values.”



## SPECIFICATION CHANGES

The Specification Changes listed in this section apply to the *Pentium® II Processor Datasheet*. All Specification Changes will be incorporated into a future version of the appropriate Pentium II processor documentation.

### 1. **BCLK Period stability change from ±250ps to ±300ps**

The following change is to Section 2.13, Table 10, *System Bus AC Specifications (Clock)*. The BCLK Period Stability for the Pentium II Processor is changed from ±250 picoseconds (ps) to ±300ps. This will be incorporated into the next revision of the *Pentium® II Processor Datasheet*, Table 10, Section 2.13. The following reflects the exact changes to the table:

**Table 10. System Bus AC Specifications (Clock)**

T# Parameter	Min	Nom	Max	Unit	Figure	Notes
T2: BCLK Period Stability			±300	ps		7, 8

**NOTES:**

- Due to the difficulty of accurately measuring processor clock jitter in a system, it is recommended that a clock driver be used that is designed to meet the period stability specification into a test load of 10 to 20 pF. This should be measured on the rising edges of adjacent BCLKs crossing 1.25V. The jitter present must be accounted for as a component of BCLK timing skew between devices.
- The clock driver's closed loop jitter bandwidth must be set low to allow any PLL-based device to track the jitter created by the clock driver. The -20 dB attenuation point of the clock driver, as measured into a 10 to 20 pF load, should be less than 500 kHz. This specification may be ensured by design characterization and/or measured with a spectrum analyzer.

### 2. **300MHz Pentium® II Processor VccCORE Transient Tolerance Change by 5mV and 10mV**

The following changes are to Section 2.13, Table 6, *Pentium® II Processor Voltage and Current Specifications*.

The Baseboard Transient Tolerance in Table 6 is changed from minimum of -0.150V and maximum of 0.150V to a minimum of -0.145V and a maximum of 0.145V.

The VccCORE Transient Tolerance is also changed from a minimum of -0.195V and a maximum of 0.195V to a minimum of -0.185V and a maximum of 0.185V. The following reflects the exact changes to the table:

This is a 300 MHz Pentium II processor only change.

**Table 6. Pentium II Processor Voltage and Current Specifications**

Symbol	Parameter	Core Freq	Min	Typ	Max	Unit	Notes
Baseboard Tolerance, Transient	Baseboard voltage, transient tolerance level	300 MHz	-0.145		0.145	V	5
V <sub>CC</sub> CORE Tolerance, Transient	V <sub>CC</sub> CORE voltage, transient tolerance level	300 MHz	-0.185		-0.185	V	6

**NOTES:**

- These are the tolerance requirements, across a 20 MHz bandwidth, **at the Slot 1 connector pins on the bottom side of the baseboard.** The requirements at the Slot 1 connector pins account for voltage drops (and impedance discontinuities) across the connector, substrate edge fingers and to the processor core. The Slot 1 connector has the following requirements: Pin Self Inductance: 10.5 nH(max); Pin to Pin Capacitance: 2 pF(max, at 1 MHz); Contact Resistance: 12 mΩ (max averaged over power/ground contacts). Contact Intel for testing conditions of these requirements.
- These are the tolerance requirements, across a 20 MHz bandwidth, **at the processor substrate edge fingers.** The requirements at the processor substrate edge fingers account for voltage drops (and impedance discontinuities) at the substrate edge fingers and to the processor core.